Effects of Credit Constraints on Productivity and Rural Household Income in China by Dong, Fengxia et al.
CARD Working Papers CARD Reports and Working Papers
10-2010
Effects of Credit Constraints on Productivity and
Rural Household Income in China
Fengxia Dong
Iowa State University
Jing Liu
Nanjing Audit University
Allen Featherstone
Kansas State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Finance Commons, and the Growth and Development Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CARD Reports and Working Papers at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in CARD Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dong, Fengxia; Liu, Jing; and Featherstone, Allen, "Effects of Credit Constraints on Productivity and Rural Household Income in
China" (2010). CARD Working Papers. 507.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/507
Effects of Credit Constraints on Productivity and Rural Household
Income in China
Abstract
Agricultural production is strongly conditioned by the fact that inputs are transformed into outputs with
considerable time lags, causing the rural household to balance its budget during the season when there are
high expenditures for input purchases and consumption and few revenues. With limited access to credit, the
budget balance within the year can become a constraint to agricultural production. As is the case in many
developing countries, Chinese rural households have been suffering from a lack of access to capital. While
China is one of the biggest countries in terms of rural areas and agricultural production, few studies have
focused on the impact of credit on agriculture in China. Using survey data, this study aims to examine how
credit constraints currently affect agricultural productivity and rural household income in China. The study
findings suggest that under credit constraints, production inputs, along with farmers’ capabilities and
education, cannot be fully employed. By removing credit constraints, agricultural productivity and rural
household income can be improved.
Keywords
credit constraint, household income, productivity, rural China
Disciplines
Agricultural and Resource Economics | Agricultural Economics | Finance | Growth and Development
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/507
 
 
 
 
 
Effects of Credit Constraints on Productivity  
and Rural Household Income in China 
 
 
Fengxia Dong, Jing Lu, and Allen M. Featherstone 
 
 
Working Paper 10-WP 516 
October 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 50011-1070 
www.card.iastate.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
Fengxia Dong is an associate scientist at the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State 
University. Jing Lu is an associate professor in the School of Economics at Nanjing Audit University, 
China. She was a visiting scholar at the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development from August 31, 
2009, to August 30, 2010. Allen M. Featherstone is a professor in the Department of Agricultural 
Economics at Kansas State University. 
 
Copyright 2010 by the authors. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document 
for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such 
copies. 
 
This paper is available online on the CARD Web site: www.card.iastate.edu. Permission is granted to 
excerpt or quote this information with appropriate attribution to the authors. 
 
Questions or comments about the contents of this paper should be directed to Fengxia Dong, 571 Heady 
Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011-1070; Ph: (515) 294-0470; Fax: (515) 294-6336; E-mail: 
fdong@iastate.edu. 
 
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, sex, marital status, disability, or status as a U.S. veteran. Inquiries can be directed to the Director of Equal Opportunity and 
Diversity, 3680 Beardshear Hall, (515) 294-7612.  
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Agricultural production is strongly conditioned by the fact that inputs are transformed into 
outputs with considerable time lags, causing the rural household to balance its budget during the 
season when there are high expenditures for input purchases and consumption and few revenues. 
With limited access to credit, the budget balance within the year can become a constraint to 
agricultural production. As is the case in many developing countries, Chinese rural households 
have been suffering from a lack of access to capital. While China is one of the biggest countries 
in terms of rural areas and agricultural production, few studies have focused on the impact of 
credit on agriculture in China. Using survey data, this study aims to examine how credit 
constraints currently affect agricultural productivity and rural household income in China. The 
study findings suggest that under credit constraints, production inputs, along with farmers’ 
capabilities and education, cannot be fully employed. By removing credit constraints, 
agricultural productivity and rural household income can be improved.  
 
Keywords:  credit constraint, household income, productivity, rural China. 
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Effects of Credit Constraints on Productivity 
and Rural Household Income in China 
 
Introduction 
China has been undertaking economic reforms since 1978. While urban residents’ income 
increased from 343 yuan in 1978 to 17,175 yuan in 2009, farmers’ income continued to lag 
behind, from 134 yuan in 1978 to 5,153 yuan in 2009. Because a widening income gap may 
jeopardize social stability, increasing agricultural productivity and farmers’ income are always 
important considerations for the Chinese government. It is both socially and economically 
crucial to investigate elements affecting productivity and find ways to improve rural household 
income.      
Agricultural production is strongly conditioned by the fact that inputs are transformed 
into outputs with considerable time lags (Conning and Udry, 2005), causing the rural household 
to balance its budget during the season when there are high expenditures for input purchases and 
consumption and few revenues. With limited access to credit, the budget balance within the year 
can become a constraint to agricultural production. When liquidity is a binding constraint, the 
amounts and combinations of inputs used by a farmer may deviate from optimal levels that in 
turn limit the optimum production or consumption choices. The marginal contribution of credit 
therefore brings input levels closer to the optimal levels, thereby increasing yield and output 
(Feder et al., 1990). Some empirical literature has found that in rural areas of developing 
countries, credit constraints have significant adverse effects on farm output (Feder et al., 1990; 
Sial and Carter, 1996), farm investment (Carter and Olinto, 2003), and farm profit (Carter, 1989).  
As is the case in many developing countries, Chinese rural households have been 
suffering from a lack of access to capital (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2001; 
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Luo, 2003; Dong and Featherstone, 2006; and Yu, 2008). Rural credit markets can be separated 
into formal and informal markets. Informal rural credit grew very fast in last few decades and 
became an important part of Chinese rural credit. Informal rural credit can take various forms. 
Interpersonal lending, which includes loans extended among friends, relatives, neighbors, or 
colleagues, is among the most basic strategies that farmers use to deal with liquidity 
requirements. Other forms include lending from moneylenders, pawnshops, and private money 
houses, some of which are illegal (Tsai, 2004). While informal credit markets are usually flexible 
in operation and play an essential financial intermediation function, they are also subject to 
various limitations (Tang, 1995). Generally, the informal rural credit markets are highly 
segmented, with participants limited to only those with personal relationships, and the cost of 
accessing informal credit varies depending on the lenders being friends and family or private 
moneylenders and money houses. Without legal protection, participants can be vulnerable to 
potential losses and abuses (Tang, 1995). In addition, informal loans are small and short-term. 
Most of the informal credit is reportedly obtained for purposes other than production, with 
construction, social expenditures (wedding, funeral, education, house construction, medical 
expenses, etc.), and consumption being dominant. Therefore, informal credit is not a good 
substitute for formal credit (Feder et al., 1990; Chen, 2003).  
Formal credit is mostly used for the financing of agricultural production (Feder et al., 
1990). The formal financial institutions currently serving rural China include the Agricultural 
Bank of China (ABC), Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), Rural Credit 
Cooperatives (RCCs), and Rural Postal Savings (RPSs). Because of high operational costs (such 
as those related to screening, monitoring, and enforcement), high financial risk (such as risks due 
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to moral hazard, few assets for collateral,1 and client’s income stability), and low returns 
(because of interest ceilings set by the government) (Dong and Featherstone, 2006), formal 
financial institutions have strict requirements for rural loans and limit lending. ABC reduced its 
service to rural areas when it was transformed into a commercial bank in the mid-1990s. 
Although a majority of its deposits are from rural areas, ABC’s support to agriculture has been 
decreasing. Although the total loans of ABC increased from about 1.37 trillion yuan in 1998 to 
over 1.86 trillion yuan in 2002, its agricultural loans decreased from 178 billion yuan to 124 
billion yuan during this period. In addition, during the 1998-2001 period, ABC reduced its 
county-level branches and offices from around 60,000 to 44,000 (OSSC-MOA, 2005). These 
changes reduced the availability of rural credit that is essential to the development of the rural 
economy. Moreover, ABC generally extends agricultural loans to agricultural enterprises and 
seldom to rural households. ADBC is a policy bank. It offers loans for the procurement, reserve, 
and marketing of grain, edible oil, and cotton; loans for the construction of agricultural 
infrastructure; and loans for integrated agricultural development. ADBC does not provide loans 
to individual rural households. As saving-only financial institutions, RPSs had been channeling 
funds from rural to urban areas. Just since June 2007 have RPSs started to offer micro-credit 
business in some areas on an experimental basis. Currently, RCCs are major suppliers in rural 
lending markets (Dong and Featherstone, 2006). By the end of 2008, there were 4,965 RCCs in 
China. They have the largest area of coverage and rural loan amounts. In 2008, RCCs extended 
1.7 trillion yuan in agricultural loans.  
To reduce capital shortages in rural China, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) relaxed the conditions of entry for financial institutions in rural areas at the end of 2006, 
allowing investors to set up new types of rural financial institutions such as township and village 
                                                 
1 Land is owned by the state, and farmers cannot use land as collateral. 
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banks and rural mutual cooperatives. At the end of 2008, 107 new types of rural financial 
institutions had obtained licenses including 91 township and village banks, 6 loan companies and 
10 rural mutual cooperatives. Their total loan balance to agriculture in 2007 reached 6.09 trillion 
yuan, of which direct agricultural loans amounted to 1.57 trillion yuan (Cao, 2009). In addition, 
to enhance micro-credit in rural areas, the CBRC also expanded the list of qualified micro-credit 
lenders from rural credit unions to all banking institutions. The size of allowable credit lines was 
raised from a range of 3,000 to 5,000 yuan to a range of 10,000 yuan to as much as 3 million 
yuan. The loan terms extend from less than one year to as long as three years. However, the 
proportion of rural households having access to bank loans is only 33% (Cao, 2009). Therefore, 
rural financial institutions still need to expand their coverage from pilot areas to remote areas to 
alleviate the capital needs of credit-constrained farmers nationwide.  
Previous Studies 
There have been many studies on the impacts of credit constraints on agricultural production and 
rural income, because access to credit is often found to be a key factor for improving 
productivity and rural living standards in less developed countries. Carter (1989) found that 
credit had a positive impact on production and can be expected to reduce the pattern of 
structurally unbalanced growth in Nicaraguan agriculture. Zeller, Diagne, and Mataya (1998) 
concluded that participation in an agricultural credit program was able to raise the cropping share 
for hybrid maize and tobacco, and membership in credit programs had a sizable effect on crop 
income in Malawi. This implies that expansion of credit access can have beneficial effects on 
agricultural production and rural incomes. Similarly, other studies have found negative effects of 
lack of access to credit on agricultural production or profitability in developing countries, for 
example, Duong and Izumida (2002) in Vietnam; Freeman, Ehui, and Jabbar (1998) in Ethiopia 
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and Kenya; Sial and Carter (1996) in Pakistani Punjab; Foltz (2004) in Tunisia; Kochar (1997) in 
India; and Guirkinger and Boucher (2008) in Peru.  
While China is one of the biggest countries in terms of rural areas and agricultural 
production, few studies have focused on the impact of credit on agriculture in China. The 
exception is Feder et al. (1990), who examined the impact of credit on productivity in Chinese 
agriculture using data collected in 1987 in Gongzhuling, Jilin province. However, at that time, 
the household responsibility system had just started. After more than 20 years of development, 
dramatic changes have occurred, such as grain market reforms, rural financial reforms, and the 
exemption of the agricultural tax.2 To understand the potential for broad-based economic growth, 
a current understanding of agricultural credit constraints on agricultural productivity and rural 
household income is essential. Therefore, it is necessary to reexamine how credit constraints 
currently affect agricultural productivity and rural household income in China.  
Research Methodology 
A household is credit constrained if the household requested more loans than were supplied, or if 
it required loans but was unable to borrow. When estimating the impact of credit constraints on 
productivity, two issues come up. The first is heterogeneity between credit-constrained and non-
constrained households. All credit-constrained and non-constrained households are not 
homogenous with respect to their credit demand (Feder et al., 1990). For example, many non-
borrowers do not borrow because they have sufficient liquidity and do not need to, while some 
do not borrow because they cannot borrow because of credit constraints. In addition, the effect 
on agricultural productivity may not be independent of credit status. Under credit constraints, 
factors of production may have differential effects on agricultural productivity than is the case 
                                                 
2 The agricultural tax was a lump-sum fee paid by farmers based on the amount of cultivated land and number of 
family members. It was abolished in 2006. 
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under unconstrained credit. Therefore, estimation methods that pool all sampled observations to 
estimate production/output functions with credit as an input or a determinant may not be 
appropriate. Separate functions for credit-constrained and non-constrained households should be 
examined. The second issue is endogeneity. Households that are not credit constrained can 
separate consumption decisions from farm production decisions and choose production inputs 
optimally for the production process (Foltz, 2004). In contrast, credit-constrained households 
may deviate from input-optimal levels to allocate limited available resources between 
consumption and production and thus may have lower productivity. Therefore, possible sample 
selection bias may arise. Thus, the econometric problem involves both heterogeneity and sample 
selection. This motivates the use of an endogenous switching regression model (Maddala, 1983), 
which consists of a joint estimation of the probability of being credit constrained and the 
productivity level.  
 First, a probit model is applied in the first stage to determine the relationship between a 
household’s credit condition and a number of socio-economic and credit variables (Feder et al., 
1990; Sial and Carter, 1996; and Freeman et al., 1998). The credit condition of the ith household 
is described by an excess credit demand function, I*, that is a function of a vector of explanatory 
variables:  
 *i i iI Z u   (1) 
where Z is a vector of exogenous variables,  is a vector of parameters, and iu is a random 
disturbance. Households are credit constrained if the excess demand is greater than zero. The 
function that indicates the household’s credit status can be specified as 
 
1, iff 0
0, iff 0.
i i i
i i i
I Z u
I Z u


  
    (2) 
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In the second stage, separate regression equations are used to model the productivity of the 
household conditional on a specified credit status. The production function of the two groups of 
households is modeled by  
 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
     iff I =1
   iff I =0
i i i i
i i i i
y X
y X
 
 
 
   (3) 
where 1iy and 2iy are the productivity for credit-constrained and credit-unconstrained households, 
respectively; 1iX and 2iX  are vectors of exogenous variables; 1  and 2 are vectors of 
parameters; and 1i  and 2i are random disturbance terms. Here, iu , 1i , and 2i are assumed to 
have a tri-variate normal distribution with mean vector zero and covariance matrix  
 
2
1 12 1
2
12 2 2
2
1 2
u
u
u u u
  
  
  
       
 (4) 
where 21 and 22 are variances of the error terms, 1i  and 2i , in equation (3); 2u is the variance 
of the error term, iu , in equation (2); and 12  , 1u , and 2u  are the covariance of 1i  and 2i , 1i  
and iu , and 2i and iu , respectively. The term 2u  is assumed to be 1 because   is estimable 
only up to a scale factor (Maddala, 1983).  
Because the disturbance terms in equation (3) are conditional on the sample selection 
criterion and have non-zero expected values, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of 1  
and 2  will suffer from sample selection bias and are inconsistent (Lee, 1978; Maddala, 1983). 
Some studies have used a two-stage estimation method to estimate the system of equations (2) 
and (3) (Lee, 1978; Feder et al., 1990; Freeman et al., 1998) or used weighted least squares to 
account for the heteroskedastic errors (Freeman, et al., 1998). The use of weighted least squares, 
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however, is limited to situations in which the exact form of heteroskedasticity is known, which is 
rarely the case (Alene and Manyong, 2007).  
To estimate the endogenous switching regression model more efficiently and with no 
strict assumptions, we use the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method (Greene, 
2000; Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). The FIML method simultaneously estimates the probit 
equation and the regression equations to yield consistent standard errors. The log likelihood 
function for this model is  
 
2 2 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 12
1
2 2 2
2 2 22
2
( / )ln ( , , , , , ) ( [ln{ ( )} ln{ ( / ) / }]
(1
( / )                                                    (1 )[ln{1 ( )} ln{ ( / ) / }])
(1
i i
u u i i
i
i i
i i
ZL I F f
ZI F f
           
      
 
   

(5) 
where F is a cumulative normal distribution function, f is a normal density distribution function, 
1 1 1/u u     is the correlation coefficient between 1i  and iu , and 2 2 2/u u     is the 
correlation coefficient between 2i  and iu . Only one value of y, 1iy  or 2iy , is actually observed 
for any given household, depending upon which regime that particular household is in, credit 
constrained or unconstrained. Therefore, 12   does not occur in the likelihood function and is not 
estimable.  
Data  
The data used in this study came from a rural financial survey conducted in Xinglonggang 
County, Heilongjiang province in Northeast China, in 2008. The county has 2,794 rural 
households, which produce mainly soybeans, corn, wheat, rice, and sweet beets. Raising cattle or 
sheep is also an important part of agricultural production. After deleting all households with 
missing values, the sample consisted of 511 rural households that accounted for 18.3% of the 
total rural households in Xinglonggang County. The survey asked demographic questions, 
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including age and education of the household head, household size, household labor, dependents 
or college students in the household, and how many members had chronic disease. The survey 
also asked financial and operational questions such as value of real estate (house), saving, 
income, production inputs and outputs, whether the farmer had a loan, the amount of the loan, 
the use of the loan, if the loan needed collateral or pledge, if a loan was received before, and 
whether the loan was repaid on time. In addition, the survey also asked the borrowing 
households if at the going rates of interest they would have liked more credit than the amount 
they were actually granted. Households that did not borrow were asked reasons for not 
borrowing. The borrowers who indicated a desire for more credit and the non-borrowers who 
responded that they could not obtain credit are classified as credit-constrained.   
 The summary statistics of the data are listed in table 1. The dependent variable in the 
criterion equation (equation (2)) is the household’s credit status (Constraint). This variable 
(Constraint) takes a value of 1 if the household is credit constrained and 0 otherwise. About 17% 
of households were credit constrained in the sample. The proportion of credit-constrained 
households in the sample data is lower compared to those used in some other studies, such as 
Feder et al. (1990).  
 The dependent variable in the switching regression model (equation (3)) is productivity 
(Prod). Because farmers engaged in several different crops and/or cattle/sheep production, 
monetary values were used instead of quantities to measure production to make it comparable 
across households. Productivity was measured as net revenue (production output value - input 
value) per household labor. The explanatory variables in the switching regression models for 
labor productivity include age, education level, number of dependents, real estate value, 
household saving, number of college students, and number of household members with chronic 
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disease. The variable age2 is included, as the effect of age may not be linear. Education is 
categorized into three levels: elementary school (edu1), junior high school (edu2), and high 
school (edu3). The variable edu1 is used as the base and deleted from the regression to avoid 
singularity. Besides all variables included in the switching regression model, variables about 
whether a loan had been received before (preloan) and whether the loan needed collateral 
(collateral) were also included as instrumental variables in the criterion model. Because all 
surveyed households that received loans before paid their loans on time, we excluded the 
variable whether the loan was repaid on time from the credit equation.  
Estimation Results 
Impacts of Credit Constraints on Productivity 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the endogenous switching regression model are 
shown in table 2. For the criterion equation of the credit status, Age increased the odds of being 
credit constrained and the effect was not linear, as the coefficient of age2 is statistically 
significant, too. Education, the number of household member with chronic disease, and the 
number of college students in the household had no statistically significant effect on the 
probability of being credit constrained. If a household had more saving, its odds of being credit 
constrained decreased. This result is similar to that of Feder et al. (1990). In addition, if a 
household had more dependents, it was less likely to be credit constrained. In contrast, if a 
household had a higher real estate value, its odds of being credit constrained were higher. This 
may reflect the fact that house construction is a large expense for a rural household. It may use 
up the capital resources of the household and thus increase the odds of being credit constrained. 
The criterion model also shows that if the household had previous loans, it was more likely to get 
a loan, which showed the role that good credit played in borrowing. But collateral did not 
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significantly affect the odds of getting a loan. Farmers in China do not have ownership of land, 
and land cannot be used as collateral. A few assets such as residential housing or machinery can 
be used as collateral, but they are generally difficult to acquire by the financial institution as they 
are necessities for farmers or for resale, which makes most lenders reticent to rely on collateral 
for loans.     
The estimates from the productivity function show that for credit-constrained households, 
only savings helped to increase productivity. This indicates that liquidity was important for 
improving productivity. In contrast, many factors affected productivity if the household was not 
credit constrained. An important implication is that if a household was credit constrained, most 
resources could not be brought into full play. For example, age did not affect productivity if the 
household was credit constrained. With no credit constraints, age had a significant negative 
effect on labor productivity, or, in other words, younger farmers had higher productivity. 
Generally, farm work is labor intensive. Only without credit constraints can younger farmers 
make full use of their physical advantage. Similarly, education did not affect productivity if the 
household was credit constrained. However, education improved productivity if the household 
was not credit constrained. A farmer with a high school education (edu3) had higher productivity 
compared to a farmer with just an elementary school education (edu1). This result has other 
important implications. China has been making great efforts to improve the level of education in 
rural areas. If the rural financing conditions are not improved and farmers are credit constrained, 
the benefits of additional education would not be as supportive for rural productivity as it could 
be. Therefore, for education to improve rural productivity, the problem of rural credit constraints 
needs to be solved. The result of education in this analysis is similar to that in Feder et al. (1990). 
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The effect of having a junior high school education was not statistically significantly different 
compared to that of having just an elementary school education. 
The number of dependents in the household positively affected labor productivity in 
credit-unconstrained households. This reflects the fact that kids generally help with household 
farm work, although they are not counted as labor. The number of household members with 
chronic disease had a significant negative effect on household labor productivity. This might be 
because other household members spend time taking care of the member with chronic disease 
and consequently this reduces their productivity. In the credit-constrained household, there is no 
statistical effect for the number of dependents and the number of members with chronic disease 
in the household. This suggests that under credit constraints, increasing or decreasing labor does 
not affect productivity, reaffirming that input factors may be underutilized because of credit 
constraints. Saving had significant positive effects for credit-unconstrained households. This 
result is unexpected because if the household were not credit constrained, saving should not 
matter to its productivity. This result implies that even without credit constraints, more liquidity 
in the household can still improve productivity perhaps through a self-insurance mechanism. 
Interestingly, real estate value (revalue) had a negative statistically significant effect on the 
productivity in credit-unconstrained households, although the impact was small compared to that 
of other factors. This might be because having a quality house is a big achievement and a goal 
for most Chinese farmers. After realizing the dream, farmers may have less motivation to work 
harder. The number of college students in the household did not have a significant effect on labor 
productivity.  
The correlation coefficients 1  and 2  are both significant. Since 1  is positive and 2  
is negative, the model indicates that individuals that were credit constrained had lower 
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productivity than a random individual from the sample would have, and those who were not 
credit constrained had higher productivity than a random individual from the sample would have. 
The likelihood-ratio test for joint independence of the three equations reported in the last row of 
table 2 showed that these three models are not jointly independent and should not be estimated 
separately.   
To further evaluate the impact of credit constraints on the productivity of Chinese 
farmers, the magnitude of this impact on productivity is estimated to determine how much the 
productivity of credit-constrained labor would increase if the constraints were removed. 
Following Guirkinger and Boucher (2008), the predicted impact for productivity in each 
constrained household is computed as 
 ˆ ˆˆ ( )U Cit itX      (6) 
where ˆU  and ˆC  are the parameter estimates for credit-unconstrained and credit-constrained 
households that are reported in table 2. The results indicate that productivity would increase from 
9,883 yuan to 13,008 yuan if the household were not credit constrained, a 31.6% increase.  
Impacts of Credit Constraints on Household Income 
The same type of analysis was also conducted on household income. All variables 
included in the income equation were the same as those in the equation of productivity except 
that the number of dependents (depnum) was replaced by the amount of labor in the household 
(lbnum) and household saving (saving) was excluded. The amount of labor in the household was 
found to directly affect the total income of the household. The reason for excluding saving from 
the income equation is that income more likely affects saving instead of vice versa. The results 
are shown in table 3.  
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Under credit constraints, no variables had significant effects on household income. 
Without a credit constraint, households with older household heads had lower household income 
than those with younger household heads. More household labor increased household income. 
The number of members with chronic disease and the education level of household heads had no 
effect on household income. Households with more college students had higher household 
income. This may indicate that college students worked while they were studying in the college 
to help earn income for their households. Generally, universities in China are located in urban 
areas where wages are higher than in rural areas.  
The coefficients 2  for the correlation between the criterion equation and the income 
equation for credit unconstrained is statistically significant and negative while 1  for the 
correlation between the criterion equation and the income equation for credit constraints is not 
statistically significant from zero. This result suggests that individuals who were credit 
unconstrained had more household income than a random individual from the sample would 
have had, and those who were credit constrained did not have higher or lower household income 
than a random individual. The likelihood-ratio test for joint independence of the three equations 
reported in the last row of table 3 showed that these three models are not jointly independent and 
cannot be estimated separately.    
Similarly, we also estimate the magnitude of how much income would increase if the 
credit constraints were removed. The calculation of the predicted impact for household income 
using equation (6) showed that if the credit constraints were removed, household income could 
be improved by 12,460 yuan, which is about a 23.2% increase.  
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Conclusions 
In this paper, we use an endogenous switching regression model that accounts for both 
heterogeneity and sample selection issues to examine the impacts of credit constraints on 
agricultural productivity and rural household income in China. The results show that factors have 
different marginal contributions to productivity and income among credit-constrained and 
unconstrained households. The productivity-enhancing effects of schooling only occur in credit-
unconstrained households. Young farmers may not be able to leverage their comparative 
advantage for physically intensive farm work under credit constraints. In addition, increasing or 
decreasing household labor does not improve productivity. These results imply that under credit 
constraints, production inputs, along with farmers’ capabilities and education, cannot be fully 
employed. Agricultural productivity and rural household income are estimated to improve by 
31.6% and 23.2%, respectively, with the removal of credit constraints. Moreover, the study 
suggests that individuals who were credit constrained had lower productivity than a random 
individual from the sample, and those who were not credit constrained had higher productivity 
than a random individual from the sample would have had. In terms of income, individuals who 
were credit unconstrained had more household income than did a random individual from the 
sample, and those who were credit constrained did not have higher or lower household income 
than a random individual. 
 An important issue in the context of agricultural credit policy is the magnitude of the 
expected productivity gain. If the marginal productivity effect of credit is small, then the 
resources may be more beneficially deployed elsewhere. This study provides important evidence 
of the effects of credit constraints on agricultural productivity and rural household income. 
Policymakers who aim to improve agricultural productivity and living standards of rural 
16 
households may need to first reduce credit constraints in rural areas to have production factors 
function to their fullest potential. With credit constraints, most production inputs may not be 
used efficiently.     
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for 511 Chinese households in Xinglonggang County, 
Heilongjiang Province, China 
  N=511 
variable Description mean std 
age Age of household head in years 45.52 10.21 
edu1 1 if the farmer has highest formal education of 
elementary school and 0 otherwise 0.16 0.37 
edu2 1 if the farmer has highest formal education of junior 
high school and 0 otherwise 0.79 0.41 
edu3 1 if the farmer has highest formal education of high 
school and 0 otherwise 0.05 0.21 
hhnum Number of household member 3.43 1.27 
lbnum Number of household labor 2.10 0.82 
depnum Number of dependents 1.34 1.10 
revalue Real estate value in 1,000 yuan 65.95 43.33 
saving Household saving in 1,000 yuan 25.04 21.77 
income Household income in 1,000 yuan 53.71 42.59 
chrdisnum Number of household member with chronic disease 0.10 0.33 
colstdnum Number of college students 0.05 0.24 
chrdis 1 if the household has member with chronic disease 
and 0 otherwise 0.09 0.29 
collateral 1 if the loan needs collateral and 0 otherwise 0.44 0.50 
preloan 1 if the household got loan before and 0 otherwise  0.75 0.43 
constraint 1 if the household applied a loan but did not get it or 
just got part of it and 0 otherwise 0.17 0.37 
prod Productivity, yuan per household labor 13.59 13.73 
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Table 2. Maximum likelihood estimates of the endogenous switching regression model for 
productivity 
Variable Criteria Equation 
(Credit constraint ) 
Productivity Equation 
Credit Constrained 
(N=85) 
Credit 
Unconstrained 
(N=426) 
 Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
age 0.116** 0.041 -0.561 0.649 -1.554** 0.267
age2 -0.001** 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.018** 0.003
edu2 0.106 0.181 -0.956 2.502 0.880 1.144
edu3 -0.277 0.379 -5.558 6.138 3.894* 2.118
depnum -0.216** 0.060 1.610 1.049 2.565** 0.383
saving -0.015** 0.004 0.146** 0.069 0.404** 0.019
revalue 0.005** 0.002 -0.042 0.028 -0.050** 0.009
chrdisnum 0.252 0.192 -2.574 2.956 -3.249** 1.251
colstdnum -0.359 0.352 8.788 7.485 2.169 1.649
preloan -1.178 0.287
collateral 0.402** 0.273
_cons -2.549 0.950 12.553 16.554 33.814** 6.441
σ1 11.440** 1.438
σ2 8.474** 0.312
ρ1 0.888** 0.061
ρ1 -0.963** 0.020
LR test for joint 
Independence of  
equations 
                           2=37.00 
 Note: ** indicates statistically significant at 5%; 
           * indicates statistically significant at 10%. 
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Table 3. Maximum likelihood estimates of the endogenous switching regression model for 
household income 
 
Variable Criteria Equation 
(Credit constraint ) 
Income Equation 
Credit Constrained 
(N=85) 
Credit 
Unconstrained 
(N=426) 
 Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
age 0.090** 0.045 -1.761 2.745 -7.613** 1.337
age2 -0.001* 0.000 0.006 0.028 0.080** 0.014
edu2 -0.017 0.203 3.703 10.843 0.566 5.842
edu3 -0.035 0.420 -20.118 28.952 2.701 10.688
revalue1 0.005** 0.002 9.650 6.434 11.673** 2.507
chrdisnum -0.195 0.216 -0.160 0.123 -0.140 0.048
colstdnum -0.598 0.468 -0.809 11.823 -0.043** 6.268
lbnum 0.034 0.108 20.585 39.151 19.475** 8.211
preloan -1.017** 0.351
collateral -0.593* 0.326
_cons -2.397** 1.060 90.734 74.698203.413** 31.248
σ1 39.063** 3.669
σ2 42.172** 1.545
ρ1 0.331 0.276
ρ1 -0.889** 0.038
LR test for joint 
Independence of  
equations 
                                  2=43.05 
      
Note: ** indicates statistically significant at 5%; 
          * indicates statistically significant at 10%. 
